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THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES
have moved vigorously to attack traditional collusive activities designed to raise prices and or
restrict output, and as penalties for such collusion have risen dramatically, it should not be
surprising that the locus of collusion is shifting to more subtle forms of cooperation among rivals. The agencies have in
turn become increasingly concerned with a new category of
collusive activity-collusion designed not to affect prices
and output directly, but rather to shape the rules under which
competition takes place.
In an interview appearing in the Fall 2001 issue of this
magazine, the FTC's Chairman, Timothy Muris, identified
three high priority areas for his new administration. For two
of the areas, "restraints among professionals" and "[shandard setting," Chairman Muris suggested an expansion of
long-standing Commission interests. A third, concern over
the possibility that in the "pharmaceutical industry, anticompetitive strategies ... [may have] involved agreements
between generic and branded manufacturers," was new, but
warranted in part because he allowed for the possibility that
"[a] branded manufacturer could engage in a series of actions
that have the effect of excluding generic competition." 1 Each
of these priorities involves agreements among competitors,
but none can be classified as traditional cartel behavior
designed to impose a monopoly solution directly on the target product.
Chairman Muris is not alone in his concern for about
the impact of nontraditional agreements among rivals.
FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary similarly noted that
automobile dealers, often operating under significant statemandated restrictions on competition, seek even stronger
regulations to harm Internet-based rivals. 2 Such restrictions
allow for increased ease of comparison among options available to consumers, and hence can cause existing rivals to
compete harder, changing market outcomes, even though
dealer rivalry determines prices either with or without the
regulations.
It is striking that, with few exceptions, these areas do not
involve traditional collusive agreements to raise prices directly. Groups of professionals, rivals, trade associations, and
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standard-setting bodies have long been on notice to avoid
even the appearance that they are engaging in traditional
collusion. Not surprisingly, their members know enough
about antitrust law to choose pricing and production levels
independently of one another. Similarly, pharmaceutical
manufacturers realize that as their intellectual property protections expire, the antitrust laws forbid them from entering
into output or pricing agreements with their new generic
competitors. In case after case involving these areas, firms
have instead sought agreement over the rules under which
competition takes place. Instead of collusion directly over
outcomes, firms attuned to the strategic impact of their activities now usually attempt to agree on ways in which to shape
their environments in order to soften competition and to
insulate themselves from hard competition in ways that will
lead to higher prices.
The appetite of businesses for techniques that can alter
their environment without running afoul of antitrust policy
is being fed by new developments in economics. After a
lengthy gestation period, the abstract theoretical findings of
game theory-the study of strategic, typically non-cooperative, behavior-are being distilled by academics, business
consultants, and hands-on managers into practical suggestions for business conduct. These suggestions focus on actions
that firms can take to affect the responses of their rivals,
often with the goal of softening competition. One prominent
effort suggests that decision makers should reduce their
emphasis on business-as-war metaphors, recognizing that
warfare can be destructive not only to one's rivals, but also to
one's own profitability.3 Indeed, the authors of this argument adopted the term "Co-opetition" for the program they
advocate, offering it as a way of ameliorating such "evils" as
"price warfare." No wonder the FTC is concerned.
We believe that while not every instance of agreement
among rivals is necessarily anticompetitive, every agreement
that is anticompetitive falls within one of three categories.'
Type I collusion encompasses traditional agreements to affect
price and/or output directly or fairly directly. 5 Type II collusion consists of agreements to disadvantage rivals. 6 And Type
III collusion gathers together and explains the types of agreements to which Chairman Muris now proposes to make a
higher FTC enforcement priority, as well as many more.
Such agreements typically do not set prices directly, but
instead help to cushion competitors from hard competition
through such "rules" as restraints on advertising, sham ethical codes, or bans on discounts, coupons, "free" services, or
extended hours of operation. 7 These restraints are becoming
commonplace due to the rapid fall in the cost of transmitting
and interpreting information occasioned by technological
advances in computation and the rise of the Internet. Firms
now find themselves in competition with a wider array of
rivals who can readily and effectively put their wares in front
of consumers and fulfill orders from remote locations. A natural response by firms threatened by heightened competition
has been to attempt to formulate rules that restrict such

information flows in order to mitigate the competitive pressure they induce. The result has been a surge in the importance of Type III collusion.
We expect this trend to continue. As antitrust scrutiny falls
increasingly on instances of agreements to shape competition,
rather than to supplant it, the need for sophisticated economic analysis will grow apace, for not all agreements to
shape the marketplace are anticompetitive. Distinguishing
those that have effects that reduce welfare from those that
provide benefits has been and will continue to be difficult. 8
The tools for analyzing such situations are likely to be provided by developments in non-cooperative game theory,
developments that have previously had limited impact on
antitrust policy, but which are likely now to attract much
more attention. The need to avoid obviously anticompetitive
collusion, the increase in agency focus on marketplace rules,
and the expansion of the tools necessary to evaluate such indirect collusion will likely result in a central role for Type III
collusion in future antitrust policy.
Collusion to Fix the Rules of Competition

Type III collusion occurs when cartel members agree upon
and implement practices that insulate cartel members to
some degree from hard competition with one another. The
restrictions cause a cushion or space in which cartel members
have some degree of pricing freedom. They are able to exploit
this cushion by charging higher prices.
These cartels limit competition and prices rise even though
cartel members never agree to set price or output directly.
Instead, cartel members compete less vigorously in the collusively-altered environment; they compete along fewer dimensions. The agreed-upon practices limit, soften, or channel
competition, but the firms still compete, in the sense that their
ultimate choices of prices or output levels are made independently. However this additional cushion or space between the
cartel members and their nearest competitors, and the subsequent isolation of consumers, gives cartel members the power
to raise price within this space. Type III collusion can be
summed up by the phrase "isolate and exploit consumers."
When the cartel is unable to achieve a total monopoly-like
outcome, either because its firms do not adhere to a cartel
agreement or because they are prevented from doing so by
fear of prosecution, the cartel may resort to Type III collusion
as an imperfect, partial substitute for Type I collusion.
Recognizing that this category consists of more than simply
a few unusual cases, but is rather one of only three general
explanations for cartels is an important step for several reasons. Cases in this category present a much more difficult set
of challenges to enforcement agencies, since the restraints
employed often consist of attempts to place distance between
rivals by limiting competition through very indirect means.
Impairing the abiliry of consumers or their agents to assess
options easily and cheaply can lead to undesirable outcomes
even when price or output competition continues to take
place among rivals in a collusively-altered environment. Yet

agreements to set rules can also give consumers the opportunity to make more transparent comparisons among rival
products, and indeed, agreements can also protect and
encourage competitive promotion by rivals. In order to distinguish among procompetitive and anticompetitive restrictions, modern tools of economic analysis, including the
game-theoretic analysis of non-cooperative behavior, will
need to be deployed in order to predict effects of restrictions
on subsequent competition. Thus far, such analyses have had
at most a modest impact on antitrust policy,9 but the growth
of Type III collusion cases will likely lead to a major expansion in the penetration of new economic tools. Thus far,
however, the cases that can be categorized as Type III have
been characterized by rough-and-ready economic analyses
of the effect of the challenged restrictions on competition. lo
Examples of rule fixing demonstrate that there are a number of avenues available to rivals who wish to shape the environment in which they compete without actually agreeing
directly on the outcome of their competition. The most
direct approach is through trade or professional association
rule making. Similar results can be obtained by restricting
advertising. A different approach involves not price setting,
but rather restrictions on price deviations, such as price discrimination, so that base prices are not fixed, but opportunities to compete are restrained. Each of these approaches can
be illustrated by examples drawn from recent cases.
Professional Associations: Pricing and Output Rules

National Society ofProfessional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978), involved some of the provisions of the ethical code promulgated by a group of consulting engineers.
These provisions forbade engineers from discussing price
with their customers until just before contracts were signed.
Customers could decline to sign after they learned what the
price of the contract was, but only after they had made a considerable investment of time working with a particular engineer. See id. at 684 n.6. The ethical code made it much more
difficult for customers to engage in comparative shopping for
engineering services. See id. at 692-93.
A group of dentists in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana
Federation ofDentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), had agreed not
to provide patients' X-rays to insutance companies. Id. at
450-51. The X-rays helped insurers determine whether certain dental procedures were necessary. See id. at 449. Instead,
the dentists agreed to require the insurance companies to
visit each dentist's office to examine patient records. See id.
at 456. This made it much more difficult for the insurers to
detect fraud and unnecessary dental work. See id. at 457.
Neither of these cases falls within the rubric of Type I
collusion. Neither involved an agreement on prices or output.
There was no agreement upon a monopoly-like outcome.
Nor was either case Type II collusion. The organizations
imposed restrictions on their owns members, not on outside
rivals, and rivals were not hurt.
Both cases, however, involved Type III collusion. The
SUMMER
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engineers' ethical code involved customers directly while the
dentists' refusal to provide X-rays directly involved third
party insurers. But the practices had very similar effects insofar as they served to establish cushions from hard competition
for cartel members, II and these cushions allowed revenue
and prices to rise. 12 The practices allowed cartel members to
"isolate and exploit" consumers to a large extent.
These professional association cases demonstrate that one
cannot readily bring conventional welfare analysis to bear on
instances of collusion designed to fix the rules of competition.
Ethical codes and advertising restrictions will typically be
defended as attempts to increase demand and consumer satisfaction by protecting the provision of consistent, high quality products. 13 The shorthand welfare test of whether the
restrictions at issue raise or lower output will often work in
such instances, but not always. The refusal of dentists to
supply X-rays was due to fear that insurers would deny authorization for procedures that the dentists would otherwise
provide-the restriction was thus intended to be demandincreasing. Yet any consumer unlucky enough to be fitted
with an unnecessary crown would not likely agree that
demand increasing was necessarily welfare increasing. 14
Advertising Restrictions
Perhaps the most common anticompetitive attempts to agree
on the rules of competition involve restrictions on advertising. Some of these collusion cases, such as Bates v. State Bar
ofArizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), challenged a nearly total
advertising prohibition (on lawyer advertising).15 Other
advertising restriction cases, such as Mass. Bd. ofRegistration
in Optometry, 110 ET.C. 549 (1988), involved severe restrictions on advertising (of optometric services).
The advertising restriction cases also were not Type I collusion. They did not involve monopoly-like agreement on
prices. In fact, classic cartels often would be impossible for
lawyers or optometrists. Too many independent entities
would be involved, and the products or services at issue
would often be unduly heterogeneous.
Nor could the advertising restrictions be classified as Type
II collusion. Neither the primary motivation behind nor the
effect of these restrictions involved outside firms. There was
no plan to target rivals by raising their costs or reducing their
revenues. Raising rivals' costs cases and reducing rivals revenues cases are outward looking, while Type III cartels are
inward looking, with the cartel imposing restrictions up on
its own members.
Type III collusion, however, describes these cases well.
Less advertising leads to less competition and some pricing
freedom. 16 Cartel members obtain some ability to "isolate and
exploit" consumers. Cartel members do not enter into any
agreement on prices, yet prices and profits rise.
Automobile Dealers

As we noted earlier, Commissioner Leary has expressed concern with efforts by automobile dealers to restrict competi38
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tion-enhancing information flows enabled by the Internet.
His concern is well placed; automobile retailing provides a
number of past examples of restrictions designed to change
the rules of competition. In one case, FTC v. Detroit Auto
Dealers Ass'n, 955 E2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992), members of the
Detroit Auto Dealers Association, consisting of every new car
dealer in the Detroit metropolitan area, entered into an agreement to severely restrict the evening and weekend hours that
they would be open. Id. at 458-59. This caused shopping for
a new car to become significantly more difficult. I?
The second case involved a newspaper, the San Jose
Mercury News, which ran an article advising buyers how to
purchase cars more effectively.18 In retaliation, the local car
dealers' association, the Santa Clara Automobile Dealers'
Association, agreed to withhold member advertising from the
newspaper. 19 This boycott was an apparently successful
attempt to convince the newspaper not to run similar articles
in the future. 20
The facts of these cases differ, but their effects were similar. Neither case involved a Type I agreement-there were no
agreements on prices or cars and no agreements to limit the
output or sale of cars. Nor did either case involve any Type
II agreements-none of the practices were directed at any
rivals of the members of the cartels.
Both cases can readily be analyzed as examples of Type III
collusion. By making shopping or negotiating more difficult,
the practices provided insulation for cartel members from
hard competition with one another. 21 The practices helped
the cartel isolate and exploit consumers to a significant
degree, so that the resulting "competitive" (independently
determined) prices would thereby be higher.
Price Discrimination
The examples above each involved a reduction in the efficiency of consumer search or comparison shopping, either
by making information more expensive or by impairing
consumers' ability to process information. The latter was the
effect both of the punishment meted out by auto dealers distressed by a newspaper story teaching consumers to be more
effective negotiators and, in the case of X-rays, of the attempt
to prevent consumers from employing expert purchasers
(insurers) as agents in acquiring dental services.
Rules can be set in other ways to shape, as opposed to supplant, competition. United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d
658, 662 (3d Cir. 1993) (the Ivy Overlap Case) involved a
number of agreements among competing universities. First,
they agreed to fix the net discounts (and therefore the net
charges) to needy students, an agreement that can be interpreted as straightforward price fIxing. 22 But in addition, they
agreed not to engage in price competition for especially talented students by agreeing not to offer merit-based scholarships to wealthy students. 23 Since tuition differed from institution to institution, and since tuition levels were apparently
set independently, this rule obviously did not fix prices, but
it did curtail competition for the high ability students that

----------

could enhance each institution's reputation and ranking and
thereby shift the demand for its services.
The agreement at issue in United States v. The Stop 6Shop Cos., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 66,689 (1984), prevented grocery stores from offering to redeem manufactuter
coupons for double their face value. This restriction did not
constitute Type I collusion because the stores still competed
on the basis of the prices of the products they sold. Nor was
it Type II collusion; no rivals were targeted. But the cartel
members did fix an important rule of competition. The
agreement not to price discriminate in favor of especially
price-sensitive shoppers, thus, falls within the category of
Type III collusion.
Welfare Effects of Type III Collusion

Type III collusion lowers consumer welfare in more ways
than does traditional collusion, though its impacts typically include those seen from classic Type I collusion.
Consumers must pay higher prices, and this causes both a
transfer of wealth from consumers to the cartel and to allocative inefficiency.
Type III collusion also can interfere with consumer choice
and thereby cause an additional type of loss to consumer
welfare. For example, in Detroit Auto Dealers Association,
consumers might well have putchased a car that was not as
optimally suited to their needs, and the dental patients in
Indiana Federation of Dentists would likely have been provided with services that were not needed, or even fraudulent.
Similar problems with uninformed consumer choice are likely to have resulted from the other advertising restriction cases
we have analyzed. 24
In addition, Type III collusion can cause inefficiency as a
result of the need for consumers to overcome the barriers that
cartel members erected to increase their insulation from vigorous competition. In other words, often consumers will
face higher search costS. 25 In Detroit Auto Dealers' Association,
for example, consumers might have had to take leave from
work to shop for a car. Finally, Type III collusion can harm
third parties, as, for example, the Santa Clara car dealers' conspiracy not to advertise hurt the San Jose Mercury News significantly.

We expect that a better understanding of each category
will help the antitrust profession to distinguish more readily
between anticompetitive collusion and the alternative of joint
activity that is harmless or beneficial, often because is protects
or standardized information. This will clearly be a difficult
process, since many Type III cases involve subtle practices,
and it often is difficult to explain why the practices at issue
are anticompetitive. We hope our articulation will help convince judges and enforcers many, though not all, are indeed
anticompetitive.
Further, we expect that our formulation of this framework will assist enforcers in uncovering practices likely to
harm consumer welfare significantly. Since Type III collusion
usually is used when more traditional collusion is not available, such as in markets with many firms and heterogeneous
products. If firms can get together and effectively fix prices
using classic Type I collusion, why should they bother with
a halfWay measure like a ban on advertising? For these reasons, rather than just observing that traditional price fixing
is unlikely for lawyers or optometrists and then concluding
that they should look for abuses elsewhere, we urge the
enforcers to examine these industries for examples ofType III
collusion instead . •

1

Interview with Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001,
at 52.

2

Thomas B. Leary, State Auto Dealer Regulation: One Man's Preliminary
View, Speech to International Franchise Association 34th Annual Legal
Symposium (May 8, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/
learystateautodealer.htm#N_1_. These state-imposed restrictions, often
immunized under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, represent only a portion of
the recent attempts by automobile dealers to increase consumer search
costs by controlling information flows. See Robert H. Lande & Howard P.
Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 941,964.

3

Adam M. Brandenburger & Barry J. Nalebuff, Co·opetition (1996). Brandenburger
and Nalebuff argue that in place of warfare, a modern business must
listen to customers, work with suppliers, create teams, establish strategic part·
nerships-even with competitors. That doesn't sound like war. Besides, there
are few victors when business is conducted as war. The typical result of a price
war is surrendered profits all around. Just look at the U.S. airline industry: it lost
more money in the price wars of 1990-93 than it had previously made in all the
time since Orville and Wilbur Wright.

Id. at 3. Competition is thus to be ameliorated or avoided when possible, and
the remainder of the book includes strategies for dOing so, including those that
change the rules under which competition takes place. See particularly Chapter
6, "Rules."

Conclusions

Every example of anticompetitive collusion can be explained
in terms of Type I, II, or III collusion, with allowance for
some overlap. Focus on Type III collusion can yield a number of practical advantages. Such collusion often affects
information flows in markets, either making information
more expensive for consumers to obtain or denying them
expertise in processing such information. With technology
lowering the cost of information, rivals can expect to face
more direct and intense competition with rivals, and can
therefore expect to seek ever more opportunities to insulate
themselves and their customers from the effects of that
information.

4

See Lande & Marvel, supra note 2.

51n Type I (or traditional) collusion, firms coordinate pricing andjor output in
order to obtain the monopoly solution either directly or fairly directly. Examples
of Type I or classic collusion include price fixing, bid rigging, assignment of cus·
tomers, and division of territories. Price fixing and bid rigging allow the competitors to achieve the joint monopoly position. Market division and customer
assignments give each cartel member a slice of the marketplace over which it
possesses a monopoly, Monopoly-like outcomes are achieved, collusively, by
each firm. Sometimes Type I collusion manifests itself in ways that help to hold
the cartel together to that makes cheating less likely (that is, in agreements that
are ancillary to an underlying and perhaps effectively hidden monopoly-like
agreement). These variations are less straightforward than simple collusion, but
their ultimate goal is the same-raise prices as if the cartel members were
monopolists. For a more complete explanation, see Lande & Marvel, supra note
2, at 944-46.
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61n Type II collusion one group of cooperating firms targets and disadvantages
rivals in a manner that later allows the colluding firms to raise prices. Two general types of practices can disadvantage rivals. The first consists of practices
that raise rivals' costs. The targets can be actual or potential rivals of the colluders. These higher costs for a cartel's rivals eventually permit the colluding
firms either to raise their own prices or to deter the entry that otherwise would
have eroded prices. The second way that a cartel can disadvantage rivals is by
reducing rivals' revenues. Boycotts, for example, can be a way for a cartel to
deprive their rivals of revenue. This strategy enables the colluders to raise
prices later. Both of these methods of disadvantaging rivals are outward-oriented because the direct targets are firms outside of the cartel. Not only do the targeted firms suffer, so too do the customers who are forced to pay higher prices.
For a more complete explanation see Lande & Marvel, supra note 2, at 947-48.
7 For examples, see Lande & Marvel, supra note 2, Section II.
8 The difficulties presented are particularly apparent in the FTC's action against
restrictions imposed by the Califomia Dental Association. The FTC initially regarded the restrictions in question as needing nothing more than a quick look to condemn, but the Supreme Court held that a more "lingering" assessment was
required. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999). On remand, the
Ninth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion, 224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000), holding that the restrictions would benefit customers by preventing misleading advertising. The rapid turnaround in interpretation of these restrictions with no change
in the evidentiary record indicates the need for clarification of standards in the
area. See also Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners
Sheila F. Anthony and Mozelle W. Thompson Respecting the Commission's
Decision Not to Petition for Certiorari in California Dental Association v. FTC,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/cdastmt.htm#N_5_.
9 See, for example, Bruce Kobayshi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem, 5
GEO. MASON L. REV. 411 (1997), and Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can
Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert? 34 AKRON L. REV. 795 (2001).
10 The lack of an agreed upon economic framework for evaluating such restraints
is among the reasons for the dramatic shift in interpretation of such restraints
evident in the Ninth Circuit's California Dental Association opinions. See supra
note 8.

Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695 ("Petitioner's ban on competitive bidding prevents all customers from making price comparisons in the initial
selection of an engineer, and imposes the Society's views of the costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace."); Indiana Federation, 476 U.S.
at 457. The Supreme Court found that the agreement forced insurance companies "to choose between acquiring that information in a more costly manner
or foregoing it altogether. To this extent, at least, competition among dentists with
respect to cooperation with the requests of insurers was restrained." Id.

11 See

12 See Indiana Federation, 476 U.S. at 459. The Supreme Court stated, "A refusal
to compete with respect to the package of services offered to customers, no less
than a refusal to compete with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs
the ability of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provision of
desired goods and services to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of providing them." Id.
13 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 693. "The Society argue[d] that the
restraint [was] justified because bidding on engineering services [was] inherently
imprecise, would lead to deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public safety and
health." Id. See also Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 452 (The Federation
argued, "its policy of withholding x rays was reasonable because the provision
of X-rays might lead the insurers to make inaccurate determinations of the
proper level of care and thus injure the health of the insured patients ... "); U.S.
v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (The Overlap group argued that,
"by enabling member schools to maintain a steadfast policy of need-blind admissions and full need-based aid, Overlap promoted the social ideal of equality of
educational access and opportunity."); FTC v. Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955
F.2d 457, 471 (6th Cir. 1992) (The Dealers argued that "efficiency justifications"
existed such as: "'(1) lower dealer overhead costs, (2) the ability to attract higher-quality sales personnel, and (3) the prevention of unionization
"');
Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 607 (1988)
(The Board argued, "such advertisements are inherently deceptive, [and] its ban
protects the public from the results of 'undue commercial influence."')
14 For an example of a case in which professional restrictions on price setting were
procompetltive, see Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598
(1984).
15 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 355 (quoting the text of Arizona's Disciplinary 2-101(B)
as follows, "A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or
40
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any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper
or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.")
16 See Mass. Board, 110 F.T.C. at 805 (stating, "Banning advertisements of discounts impedes entry by new optometrists that depend on attracting a high volume of patients. Discounts also attract patients during times of low demand. A
prohibition on discount advertisements obstructs such efforts to promote efficient use of resources. By preventing optometrists from informing consumers
that discounts are available, respondent eliminates a form of price competition:
(citations omitted)).
17 See Detroit Auto Dealers, 955 F.2d at 477 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the FTC Commission report which stated, "the restric·
tion reduces efficiency, since without it consumers could reorganize their activo
ities in a way that would increase their overall satisfaction.").
18 See A Car Buyer's Guide to Sanity: Here's a Low-Price, Low-Stress Route to Getting
the Most for Your Dollar, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 22,1994.
19 See FTC Press Release, Santa Clara County Auto Dealers Association
Settles Charges over Alleged Advertising Boycott, FTC File No. 941 0107,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/9508/scautoad.htm.
20 See id. The FTC asserted that the" boycott" or punishment occurred pursuant
to an agreement and was anticompetitive because it "restrains competition
among dealers and chills the publication of important consumer information."
Id.
21

See Detroit Auto Dealers, 955 F.2d at 477 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the FTC case included letters from the dealers
demonstrating that they "expected the hours restriction to benefit them by limiting comparison shopping," and this limitation was expected to result directly
in higher prices, "with fewer shopping hours, the public can devote less time to
shopping, and forcing down prices."); FTC Release, supra note 19 (stating, "The
car dealers could have made individual decisions to pull their advertising, but
an agreement to do so restrains competition among dealers and chills the publication of important consumer information, making it more difficult for consumers to compare dealer prices and services."); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving:
Gender and Race Discrimination In Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817
(1991). Ayres provides the following example closely tracking our analysis: "One
dealer, interviewed informally, espoused a desire to close his showroom in the
evening, if his competitors would follow suit. Although forcing consumers to purchase at inconvenient times would seem to reduce the demand for cars, the dealer felt that restricting showroom hours would also reduce the amount of search
that buyers undertake. Thus, the dealer believed that although he might not get
as many people in his showroom, he would have less competition for those who
did arrive." Id. at 872 n.90.

22 See id. at 662 n.2. "The purpose of the Overlap agreement is to neutralize the
effect of financial aid so that a student may choose among Ivy Group institutions
for non-financial reasons." Id.
23 See id. at 663. Only differences of less than $500 were permitted. See id. As
evidence of this agreement regarding wealthy students, the court cited to the
retaliatory actions of the Overlap Group when one member awarded scholarships
based on merit. See id. The cou rt stated:
All Ivy Overlap Group institutions understood that failing to comply with the
Overlap Agreement would result in retaliatory sanctions. Consequently, noncompliance was rare and quickly remedied. For example, in 1986, Princeton
began awarding $1,000 research grants to undergraduates based on academiC merit. After a series of complaints from other Overlap institutions who
viewed these grants as a form of scholarship, Princeton terminated this
program.

Id.
24 As we have pointed out, however, the difficulties of analyzing potentially anticompetitive Type III agreements are significant. Restrictions on advertising can
lead to more local consumer choice at convenient locations when the restrictions
prevent free riding on those local services. For a particularly difficult case, see
United States V. Scuba Retailers Ass'n (Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Default Final Judgment), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0800/0896.htm. In
this case, retailers boycotted a specialty scuba diving publication for accepting
advertising from a manufacturer who offered its wares directly to consumers.
25 See supra note 21 for an example of higher search costs to consumers.

